

January 26, 1972

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

Extension of Remarks

E 511

STATINTL

HENRY KISSINGER: THE MAN WHO CONTROLS THE DESTINY OF AMERICA

HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, January 26, 1972

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, events of the past day indicate even more clearly than before that Henry Kissinger is privy to state secrets denied the Members of the Congress and the American people. It seems as if the President believes that he and Dr. Kissinger can, acting in secret, determine the future course of America.

I, for one, am convinced that this country is too great and its liberties too precious to be entrusted to the minds of two men—President Nixon and his alter ego, Henry Kissinger. This Congress and the American people have the right to know.

Had President Nixon told the American people the truth some 30 months ago, this country would not be so polarized, so divided. The truth is that much of the confusion in America results from deliberate, political maneuvering on the part of the President.

The American people have the right to know the truth about Henry Kissinger, this man who is above congressional investigation, who is not answerable to the people or to their elected representatives.

The American people have the right to know who this Henry Kissinger is and what entitles him to be set above other men. I include two interesting articles delineating the true nature of this man and his relationship to the President in the *Record* at this point:

[From the Washington Post, July 11, 1971]

HENRY KISSINGER: NIXON'S METTERNICH
(By David Landau)

(The writer is managing editor of the *Harvard Crimson*, in which the following appeared as part of a series of three articles on the career of Henry A. Kissinger.)

"He was a roccoco figure, complete finely carved, all surface, like an intricately cut prism. His face was delicate but without depth, his conversation brilliant but without ultimate seriousness. Equally at home in the salon and in the Cabinet, he was the *beau-ideal* of [an] aristocracy which justifies itself not by its truth but by its existence. And if he never came to terms with the new age it was not because he failed to understand its seriousness but because he disdained it."

With these words, a Harvard thesis-writer named Henry Kissinger introduced Clemens Metternich, Austria's greatest foreign minister. Metternich was a man whom Kissinger emulated, whose diplomatic life he has sought to relieve. And the comparison of the two is far from inapt.

As Richard Nixon's most influential adviser on foreign policy, Kissinger has embodied the role of the 19th-century balance-of-power diplomat. He is cunning, elusive and all-powerful in the sprawling sector of government which seeks to advise the President on national security matters. As Mr. Nixon's personal emissary to foreign dignitaries, to academia and—as "a high White House official"—to the press, he is vague and unpredictable. Yet he is the single authoritative carrier of national policy besides the President himself.

Like the Austrian minister who became his greatest political hero, Kissinger has used his position in government as a protective cloak to conceal his larger ambitions and purposes. Far from being the detached, objective arbiter of presidential decision-making, he has become a crucial molder and supporter of Mr. Nixon's foreign policy. Instead of merely holding the bureaucracy at comfortable arm's length, he has entangled it in a web of useless projects and studies, cleverly shifting an important locus of advisory power from the Cabinet departments to his own office. And as confidential adviser to the President, he never speaks for the record, cannot be made to testify before Congress, and is identified with presidential policy only on a semi-public level.

A CONSTITUENCY OF ONE

Like the ministers who ruled post-Napoleonic Europe from the conference table at Vienna—and the Eastern Establishment figures who preceded him as policy-maker of a later age—Kissinger believes that legislative bodies, bureaucracies and run-of-the-mill citizenries all lack the training and temperament that are needed in the diplomatic field. He is only slightly less moved by the academics who parade down to Washington to peddle their ideas. And, when one sets aside popular opinion, Congress, the bureaucracy and the academic community, there remains the resident alone. The inescapable conclusion is that Henry Kissinger's only meaningful constituency is a constituency of one.

It might have seemed surprising that, only a month after his election, Mr. Nixon would have chosen one of his most vocal antagonists—the foreign policy adviser of his chief rival, Nelson Rockefeller—as a leading policy aide. But the two men had much more in common than anyone would have supposed.

To begin with, Mr. Nixon turned out not to be the partisan, suspect observer of the international scene whom Kissinger had so feared. Quite the contrary—Mr. Nixon was determined to take hold of the foreign policy machine and fashion his own commitment to world order, regardless of public and congressional opinion. In the past, decisions had been made in a chaotic, *ad hoc* atmosphere which lacked consistency and framework; the new President decided that such practice should cease.

For somewhat different reasons, Kissinger agreed that policy planning should be centered in the White House. For Kissinger, the balance-of-power diplomat, had long believed that world equilibrium was based on the constant threat of force, and that respect for the United States rested on the fear of its enormous military machine. At times, secret talks and well-placed overtures could avert military engagements that were not in the interest of the United States; at others, where an escalation to armed conflict seemed necessary, the decisions must be made and the orders carried out by a few top men who acted with the greatest of speed.

Such a policy of threat demanded a high degree of centralization—and the resulting Nixon-Kissinger policy structure was designed to circumvent those forces in government, such as Congress and the Cabinet bureaucrats, which were considered extraneous to that approach.

GUARDING CREDIBILITY

In addition, Kissinger realized that the policy of threat would be a failure if Mr. Nixon could not appear unfettered by others—inside Washington and out—who had claims on the President's conduct of foreign affairs. In as early a tract as "A World Restored," his 1954 Ph.D. thesis on Metternich and the restructuring of post-Napoleonic Europe, Kissinger had written that "the impetus of domestic policy is a direct social experience; but that of foreign policy is not actual, but potential experi-

ence—the threat of war—which statesmanship attempts to avoid being made explicit. In other words, popular opinion was little more than an encumbrance on those few who were capable of making decisions. For if the foreign diplomat were allowed to feel that the President's policy could be swayed by domestic upheavals, then the credibility of threat—the linchpin of the policy—would ultimately collapse.

Corollary to the policy of threat was the notion that the United States would keep its promises and fulfill its commitments no matter what the price. For the ultimate failure of diplomacy was to lose credibility, and there was a feeling for the honor of a great power that went very deep in Kissinger. There was the idea that a faulted credibility in one area of the world would surely lead to disaster in another, because for Kissinger all the great troublespots of the world were lined up on a single continuum that connected the two superpowers: the Soviet Union and the United States. Should the Russians violate the ceasefire lines in the Mideast, then the President must be free to respond in Cambodia. And if the policy made no sense in cost-benefit analysis, at least it would proceed from strategic thinking which transcended the day-to-day pressures of political life.

WHITE HOUSE PREDOMINANCE

Kissinger felt that the presidency was the only office of government which could determine and execute foreign policy in the way it should properly be conducted. Congress was an impediment; its members, by and large, were not properly schooled in the hard-fought, intricate practice of diplomatic affairs and were more likely to respond to the uninformed concerns of their voters, to the shoddy tug-and-pull of the popular political process, than to the arduous twists and turns of great-power relationships. The bureaucracy, too, was an enemy; no imagination, no flair, no speed or adaptability, little grasp of the sacrifices and risks one must incur if the one were to maintain a flexible policy.

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And as for popular opinion, Kissinger's interest lay not in how the votes would be cast today, but in how the executive structure would be affected by domestic reactions to the policy when that policy had finally run its course five or ten years later. His overwhelming concern was how well the White House could continue to function as the major force in foreign policy, whether popular opinion would one day rise up and destroy the presidency as an instrument of diplomatic relations. And when Kissinger finally agreed to go to work for the man he had scorned as a presidential candidate, it was only on the condition that the policymaking structure be geared to White House predominance.

In a series of meetings at the end of November, 1968, Mr. Nixon invited Kissinger to accept the post of foreign policy assistant and proposed a revival of the National Security Council. Set up under Truman after World War II to coordinate policy planning, the NSC system had long since fallen into obscurity, but Mr. Nixon viewed it as an instrument of restoring to the White House a critical measure of flexibility and control over policy decisions. More than anything else, he dreaded being handed a single policy recommendation which, more often than not, might be a compromise policy, an effort on the part of several differing agencies which had subdued their disagreements and presented the White House with a position it could then only accept or reject.

Underlying the revived NSC structure was the so-called "options" system; the recommendations of each agency would be solicited